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whether the reader interprets his remarks about the economics of land use as
an "erroneous" view personal to Mr. Haar or as a description without too much
critical analysis of the "erroneous" views of the British sponsors of the act.
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The Federal Bureau of Investigation. By Max Lowenthal. New York: Sloane
Associates, i95 o . Pp. 559. $4.50.
The Bureau was young when I first met it in 1917. Its official title was, "The
Bureau of Investigation of the Department of Justice." As such it had no place
in the public mind. The newspaper men took its stories but balked at its title.
Perhaps they called it "The Secret Service," which made the staff of that
ancient and honorable organization unhappy, or perhaps they called it the "De-
partment of Justice," which made uncomfortable those who thought this
derogated from the dignity of the United States Attorney. More often, perhaps,
the stories would be credited merely to a government or Federal agent. The
Bureau was anonymous.
William J. Flynn, head of the Secret Service, became Chief of the Bureau in
I99. He was widely known and had a magazine named after him which
published stories appropriate to its title. In 1921 William J. Burns succeeded
Mr. Flynn. He was a private detective with a country-wide reputation. In the
popular mind he was Mr. Detective himself. But neither Mr. Flynn nor Mr.
Burns succeeded in personifying the Bureau's title. Mr. Hoover took over in
1924. The title of the Bureau was changed to "The Federal Bureau of Investiga-
tion." Mr. Lowenthal places the date of the change in 1935. Thereafter, under
its initials FBI, the Bureau has become a household name and has gathered a
popular following that rates it a place in the herd of politically sacred cows.
Mr. Lowenthal raises several questions relative to the Bureau, of which the
most significant in his analysis, may be stated thus: "What is the impact of a
central police force on American Society, a police force which may be and is
dedicated to political purposes?"
He strikes his key note in the opening chapter, where the Bureau's history
begins.
It was 19o8; Charles J. Bonaparte was Attorney General, Theodore Roose-
velt, President. Mr. Bonaparte urged upon Congress the importance of creating
a bureau of investigation in his Department. Congress, however, was leery.
One member said that it "would be a great blow to freedom and to free institu-
tions if there should arise in this country any such great secret service bureau
as there is in Russia and was in France under the Emperor, and one time in
Ireland." A contemporary newspaper viewed the proposal in the light of the
"Hated Black Cabinet of St. Petersburg" and of Fouch6, who was the reservoir
of everybody's secrets and intimidated Napoleon himself. It expressed the
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opinion that "There is no desire for a general detective service or a national
police organization in connection with the Federal Government. On the con-
trary, there is in Congress an utter abhorrence of such a scheme."
The 6oth Congress, to which the proposal was made, did not merely refuse
to go along, it positively forebade the Treasury Department to lend its Secret
Service operatives to fellow government agencies, including the Department of
Justice. Nevertheless, when the next Congress met the Bureau had been
started-informally, of course-but it existed. Under pressure from the Presi-
dent and the Attorney General, Congress made an appropriation for it and in re-
turn received solemn assurances that the Bureau would never be used for
political purposes.
The manner in which the author develops his story in indicated by the cita-
tions given above. He interposes a minimum of his own views and a maximum
of cited authority taken from Congressional and court records, from reports
and statements of Attorneys General, from contemporary comments of the
press, of public men, and of those affected by the Bureau's doings. It is other
people, not the author, who discuss theBureau, pro and con, and from these dis-
cussions emerges an understanding of the Bureau's history and of its character
which supports those "Prophets of evil" of i9o8 who foresaw in the creation of
the Bureau the birth of a monster.
[Since there are nearly five hundred pages of text, an impressionistic view of
the contents of the book is all that will be attempted.]
When the Bureau began it had an inactive miscellany of laws to watch over.
Its first pervasive job came in I9io when Congress passed the statute generally
known as the "White Slave" or "Mann Act."
The First World War gave the Bureau a major assignment. As an index to
what happened, I might point out that when the war opened there was one
agent stationed in Philadelphia. His territory included the Eastern District of
Pennsylvaniak and the Middle District which extends westward to the Alle-
gheny Mountains: the Southern District of New Jersey, and the District of
Delaware. A second agent at the time happened to be working out of the Phila-
delphia office on a special assignment. He stayed. The first "Agent in Charge"
transferrred to Washington within a year, and the second agent became "Agent
in Charge." Before the war was over, he had some sixty men under him.
It was early announced that the Bureau was in charge of spy catching and
was to be the "eyes and ears" of the government. In that capacity it preserved
-in its files comments of every nature and from any source which indicated pro-
German leanings upon the part of any member of the community.
This material became significant in 1918. A hot Congressional fight was in
progress. Domestic politics does not shut up shop because of an incidental
matter like a World War. Charges were made. A Congressional investigation
followed, and, after the armistice, the Bureau's files were given a public viewing.
The information therein threw a shadow over a wide circle of persons. There
were outcries against "smearing"; against character assassination "by sug-
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gestion and innuendo"; and protests against the injustice of attributing "guilt
by association"; outcries that since that time have become familiar parts of our
vocabulary.
The enforcement of the Selective Service Act was part of the Bureau's work,
and, in the performance of this assignment, it conducted draft raids, which
were productive of a great deal of excited discussion both in Congress and the
press. Its critics maintained that the Bureau lacked the most primitive under-
standing of the rights of citizens.
After the armistice, the Bureau's interest in pro-Germans and slackers faded.
It became devoted to those elements generally classified as "Reds." The climax
of the Bureau's battle against them was reached in the Red raids of January 3,
192o. These raids bulk large in the book; at least a quarter of it is devoted to
them. They are treated from every angle, and the result of the treatment reveals
how brutal and lawless a law enforcement agency can be.
Although the Red raids may have been the climax, they did not terminate the
Bureau's hunt, which carried on under Attorney General Daugherty, who was
persuaded that the influence of the Third Internationale in this country was
real and that it was responsible for many things that happened here of which he
disapproved.
With the coming of Attorney General Harlan F. Stone in 1924 under Presi-
dent Coolidge, a ruling was made that the Bureau should confine its activities to
the normal procedures of crime detection. The influence of this ruling was
effective for some thirteen to fifteen years.
When the European war opened in September 1939 the Bureau's Chief, Mr.
Hoover, promptly announced that the President "has instructed the Federal
Bureau of Investigation to take charge of all investigative work in matters in-
volving espionage, sabotage, subversive activities. . . ." A short time later he
told us, "We have a distinct spy menace."
The activities of the FBI during the war are set forth in one short chapter
under the heading of "Spies and Saboteurs," in which a series of cases are men-
tioned. The part played by the FBI in these cases is so described as to leave the
impression that the Bureau caught no one who was not delivered to it duly
tagged and briefed, and that everything it undertook from Pearl Harbor to the
Coplon case was fumbled.
In the very last chapter, titled "Investigation of Beliefs," the FBI is por-
trayed as busying itself with labor movements and strikes on the theory that
they were communist inspired; with alleged communists and with the Federal
employees loyalty program which has become an inquisition into left wing
entanglements.
The book closes on this note, with a reference to the dossiers that people
the FBI's files in great numbers, and a throwback to 19o8. The suggestion is
made that the policy followed in collecting the dossiers represents "a realization
of the fear expressed during the 6oth Congress."
The impression of the FBI reached by a reading of Mr. Lowenthal's book is
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an unpleasant one. As a detector of criminals it appears inept; as an oppressor of
persons because of their beliefs it is sinister.
The reviewer cannot altogether quarrel with the impression created. He cer-
tainly cannot quarrel with the facts presented that go to make up that im-
pression. The bulk of them relate to things done between 1917 and 1924, a
period approximately corresponding to his own tenure of office. Nor does he
complain of the criticisms which have been cited, and yet he is aware that out of
it all comes a creature that bears but a distorted likeness to the FBI.
To begin with, the accusing finger points continually at the Bureau as if it
were always the principal actor-in fact the only actor-in the doing of all of
those things which we now think should not have been done. Moreover, the
acts themselves have a twisted appearance because they are viewed out of
context. Many of them have a political cast, and it is impossible to appraise them
properly without an understanding of their political background. So, my func-
tion will be to present the Bureau in its proper setting in its relation to other
government agencies with which it functioned and to show the factors that
entered into carrying on the activities that are particularly complained of and
to what extent they represented a response to the popular will of the moment.
However, before entering into this broader field, I think it reasonable to com-
ment on the deprecatory references to the Bureau's crime detection work. I
don't altogether approve of them. I may have a personal reason, for I sat with
the agents of the Bureau and puzzled with them over ways and means of find-
ing the Bombers of 1919. We had several bombings that year in Philadelphia.
We did not find the Bombers. Mr. Lowenthal has set forth the pronouncements
of the Bureau during the period of the hunt (they were full of promise), and he
compares them with the accomplishments of the Bureau which, in that par-
ticular, were nil, and makes the Bureau look foolish. I admit we felt foolish, but
we took every turn and twist to find a lead, and we worked on every suspect to
force a break to the inside, but we got neither a lead nor a break. We had
theories, but they proved nothing. So nothing happened.
I might add that in the holding of several official positions I have become
familiar not only with the Federal crime detection agencies, but also with our
Pennsylvania State Police and our Philadelphia City Police. I learned what we
all should realize to be true, that none of these organizations have occult power,
although they all may do good work, and that there is nothing mysterious about
investigating crime.
I know nothing at first hand of the cases mentioned in the chapter on "Spies
and Saboteurs." Whether they were handled well or badly by the FBI is a sub-
ject upon which I have no opinion, but before criticizing it for a failure to solve
any given problem I would flrst want to know the facts it had available for the
solution and the use it made of them.
In a broader field of public relations the Bureau is criticized because shortly
after the armistice, when its files were opened, they were found to contain re-
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ports of a slanderous nature concerning a great many people. The question is
whether this criticism was justified.
When the war opened in I917, there was a widespread, popular conviction
that the country was infested with spies and enemy agents and that the Govern-
ment should exterminate the pests. The entire populace seemed to transform
itself into one great detective agency. Further, in Philadelphia there were a
number of special organizations, for example, the American Protective League,
made up of volunteers, two military and two navy intelligence services. We were
deluged with reports of suspects and called upon to pass on a continuous succes-
sion of cases which, on analysis, would result in release of the suspect. It is true
we caught no spies. We learned after the war that the other districts had been
equally unsuccessful, but we could not permit any information whether we
thought it immediately of value or not, to be ignored. So far as possible, every
lead was run down by an agent. He wrote a report on what was told him, what
he did and what he learned. He did not appraise it. A copy was sent to Wash-
ington and a copy to the United States Attorney. The latter official was called
upon to appraise the report and to take such action as it called for. If none were
called for, he filed it. Further information might make the original report valu-
able. That there was much in the reports concerning many people given for
reasons other than patriotism was to be expected, and their presentation to the
public as though they had the official backing of the Department of Justice
understandably aroused great indignation. I can sympathize with the indigna-
tion, but at the time I thought the Bureau's procedure was sensible and appro-
priate to the service it was called upon to render. We were concerned at the time
not so much with crimes that had been committed as with endeavoring to
identify those persons in the community whose thinking, whose talk, and whose
associations were such that they might be suspected of being enemy agents or
disloyal. When you are concerned with such intangible matters there is no way
to measure the relevancy or irrelevancy of any particular bit of information. It
must all go in the file.
The draft raids are another matter for which the Bureau is held responsible
and for which it is criticized. The raids occurred in i918, a year in which there
was an uneasy feeling that many men had evaded the draft and that something
should be done about them. The answer was the dragnet draft raid, a spectacu-
lar demonstration of the Government's activity. I don't know who thought up
the idea, but I do recall that the leading figures in the American Protective
League, which in a sense represented the public, were supporters of the idea, and
they joined the "Agent in Charge" in making the plans. In addition, the
League supplied the bulk of the manpower required.
I went on two of the raids that were conducted in Philadelphia as the repre-
sentative of the United States Attorney's office. Both were filled with interest-
ing incidents. They did result in depriving many innocent persons of their
liberty, in an exasperating manner, for a period varying from minutes to ten
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or twelve hours. The latter extreme was due to a delay in securing reports from
local draft boards. The legal justification for our action was probably dubious,
though I doubt that the courts would have denied our right to act as we did.
The number of slackers arrested was not substantial foi the good reason, I be-
lieve, that the number of draft evaders in the country was negligible, but we
did not know that at the time. I will let the matter stand at that point. I think
it was wise to condemn the raids, but knowing how they came about I cannot
be too severe on those who promoted them. They certainly seemed to be a good
idea at the time.
Since the political activities of which the Bureau stands accused are largely
those directed against the left wing, some history of them may be appropriate.
In 1917 Francis Fisher Kane was the United States Attorney in Philadelphia.
He was in command of the Department of Justice in his own district-a Demo-
crat in an overwhelmingly Republican town. President Wilson had made it clear
that he believed the guarantees of freedom of speech and liberty of the press
persisted in the face of war. He signed the Espionage Act of June i5, 1917, with
the declaration that it would never be used to prevent criticism of him or his
administration.
In the Republican ranks, the most vigorous spokesman was Theodore Roose-
velt. He was a fighting man par excellence. There was a fight on. We had to win.
There was only one aim in war-victory. We would win if we had the will to win.
Those who questioned the war or its aims weakened our will to win. They were
unhung traitors.
In Philadelphia there were at least seven English language newspapers, all
of which supported the war. One in particular, the North American, preached
as Mr. Roosevelt preached. Also, there was a Socialist Party and a German lan-
guage Socialist newspaper, the Tageblatt. The former printed a leaflet attacking
the constitutionality of the Selective Service Act. The leaflet was distributed on
the streets. The local police arrested the distributors and were applauded.
When they brought their captives to the Bureau to be held for treason, all were
released on orders of the United States Attorney. Mr. Kane was a friend and
loyal supporter of the President, and he had convictions of his own which he
would not easily give up. These convictions were not understood. No one cared
to listen to them. The Tageblatt was opposed to the war and demanded a state-
ment of aims. Its editorials were translated and reprinted in the North American
with bitter comments both in the news columns and the editorials. There was
a widespread demand for the suppression of both dissenters which went on for
months. Mr. Kane's picture was carried in the paper and assigned as the reason
why treason flourished in Philadelphia. It was nearly five months after the war
opened before United States Attorney Kane directed a raid on the Socialist
Party headquarters and shortly thereafter on the Tageblatt. The reasons for his
moving when he did are intricate legal ones with which nobody was concerned.
Out of the first raid rose the case of ScItenck v. United States'; out of the second,
1249 U.S. 47 (1919).
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Scaefer v. United States.2 The former is probably the most quoted case in our
legal literature. I think of the thousands that refer to Mr. Justice Holmes' words
relative to "clear and present danger" and to all of them the plaintiff is nothing
but an awkward collection of six consonants and a vowel, but he was a man-a
mannikin of a man with a pale moon face, a nubbin of a nose and troubled blue
eyes, but he had a faith, and he suffered for it.
These two cases constituted our major attack on the dissenting groups.
The agents of the Bureau took part in the two raids but under direction of the
United States Attorney. The responsibility was his, just as it was his responsi-
bility to refrain from interfering with anti-war and anti-conscription meetings
held by the censors, and from interfering in labor troubles.
After the armistice, we looked back and realized that we had come through
a storm, and although we had tried and convicted many persons for miscellane-
ous offenses our chief service had been rendered in tempering the storm. It
seems that the fear of thought and the will to suppress it, aroused by the war,
was a quality not to be laid aside, so we moved on after the armistice without
a break from our hunt for pro-German and the disloyal, to a hunt for the Reds.
In 19i9 fear and hatred of the Reds was as virulent as anything that had as
yet possessed us. The bombings of i919 did not allay our fears. Following them
came the raids on the Union of Russian Workers in October and on the third of
January, 1920 occurred the spectacular "Red" raids. They were directed from
Washington. Mr. Kane did not approve of them and resigned from office. He
thought them irresponsible and unjustified, not necessary for the safety of the
nation, nor conducted within the terms of any act of Congress passed for the
purpose.
A question arises as to why these raids occurred. Of course, nobody knows
with accuracy, but the following facts may be illuminating. The President was
incapacitated and his administration had gone asprawl without any controlling
intelligence. The Attorney General was a candidate for the Democratic nomina-
tion for President, the nominating convention was to meet in July. The Red
issue loomed large in the popular mind. Mr. Palmer had become the nation's
champion in fighting against that menace. The Red raids constituted a spec-
tacular demonstration of his championship.
A. Mitchell Palmer was a Pennsylvanian, a large open-faced handsome man
with affable manners. The party leaders in sixty-seven counties called him
Mitch. I always suspected that his concern for the Bill of Rights was somewhat
free and easy. He probably would have said that Frank Kane was too fussy
about it. Mr. Kane himself to this day explains Mr. Palmer's action by saying
that he was as much obsessed with fear and hatred as other people, and that
he had a special reason because his own home in Washington had been bombed.
But some of the party philosophers didn't look at it that way. One who was not
a learned man but a wise one remarked that playing for the presidency was a
2 251 U.S. 466 (1920).
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great game. The stakes had become the greatest in the world and in it anything
was expendable.
I have arranged the facts. Motives are always mixed, even the man that ex-
presses them in his actions may not understand them, so any one looking on
may interpret them as he chooses.
From Mr. Lowenthal's review of the FBI's political activities they would
appear negligible between the years 1924 and 1946, when the Bureau picked up
the trail of the Communist. This period, however, was not a political vacuum.
It was filled with differences as bitter as any the country has ever known. We
entered the Second World War with the most violent opponents of the Ad-
ministration and its foreign policies in a position where they could be labeled
anti-war, pro-German, pro-Nazi and pro-Fascist. What happened to them is a
long and unhappy story.
If Mr. Lowenthal is still looking for evidence as to what can be done through
the FBI, under its present centralized direction from Washington, to oppress
dissenting individuals and groups, it would be well for him to study the period
from December 8, I941 to the end of 1945.
It is an interesting commentary on our political attitudes that this phase of
our war activities has been blacked out. In fact, it is the fashion to congratulate
ourselves that during the Second World War no such abuses of civil liberties oc-
curred as happened in the First World War. I saw at fist hand what happened
in both, in my own sector of the country, and will merely say that such self-
congratulation is utter hypocrisy.
In summarizing, I would say that the FBI is not of itself sinister. It is merely
the symptom of a disease: if you choose to call our present fear of thought and
our will to suppress it a disease. We acquired that quality in the First World
War, and it has remained with us since. If it persists, the FBI must persist in
collecting dossiers on such persons as may be suspected of inhabiting the field of
thought of which we are afraid, whether they be pro-Germans, Fascists, Nazis,
Communists, or such other similar group as may tomorrow be included in our
fears. That is now and will continue to be the FBI's duty, and it cannot be con-
demned for doing its duty.
What I have said should not be taken to mean that the matters described by
Mr. Lowenthal should not be set before us as vividly as possible, for the spot-
lighting of the symptom of the disease may awaken us to the disease itself. That
Mr. Lowenthal has done well, with the care and precision of a lawyer. I con-
gratulate him upon it, though I do wish he had made it clear that in oppressing
those suspected of the thought we hate, neither we nor the FBI discriminate be--
tween National Socialists and International Socialists.
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